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that if an offset is allowed only when consumers
opt for a refund, then consumers will never
choose the refund option. A consumer might
wish a refund if the defect isimmediately apparent or if the consumer is sufficiently dissatisfied
to want to purchase a different type of vehicle.
Regarding the defendants' argument that the
Chmills would receive a windfall if they were
given a new car without an offset for their use of
the old car, the court held that it was not unreasonable to allow the Chmills to receive a new car
without an offset for use. The Chmills used the
vehicle they purchased from Friendly because

Friendly had been unable to repair the defect.
Moreover, the Chmills had been required to
litigate their claim for over ayear and had necessarily used the car during this period.
Finally, the court noted that the Lemon Law
provides that the court may award costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorneys' fees, including attorneys' fees for essential appellate
work. The court concluded that on remand the
trial court should determine reasonable attorneys' fees to award to the Chmills for their appeal. Such an award was necessary to fully enforce the Chmills' rights under the Lemon Law.
Elbert D. Reniva

ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
HOLDS THAT A MARKETING
PLAN NEED NOT MEET FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION CRITERIA
TO QUALIFY AS A PYRAMID
SALES SCHEME

the number of "down-line" subscribers, ranging from 1%, or $1.08/month, for the first downline level (three subscribers), to 6% plus a 5%
bonus, or $77,944.68/month, for the ninth level
(19,683 subscribers).
Subscribers could become marketers merely
by signing the marketer's agreement, but individuals who wished to become marketers without being subscribers were required to pay a
"set-up" charge of $52. Although not required
to do so, all 10,874 subscribers had signed marketers' agreements. Approximately 1000 of these
signatories were active marketers.
Procedural History
The State of Illinois ("State") brought suit
against Unimax and its president, Tim Dern,
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ("the Act"). Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 261-272 (1987). The State
alleged that Unimax's marketing plan was a
"pyramid sales scheme" and a "chain referral
sales technique" in violation of the Act. The
State sought appointment of a receiver and
asked the court to enjoin the defendants from
selling memberships. Further, the State asked
that Unimax provide an accounting, that it be
forced to disgorge all profits, and that it be
assessed $50,000.
Unimax argued that its operations were
neither a pyramid sales scheme nor a chain referral sales technique as prohibited by the Act.
Section 1(g) of the Act defines a "pyramid sales
scheme" as one in which aperson pays rmoney in
exchange for the opportunity to receive a benefit primarily "based upon the inducement of
additional persons" to participate in the same
plan or operation. Unimax claimed that the tra-

In People ex rel. Hartigan v. Unimax Inc., 168
Ill. App. 3d 718,523 N.E.2d 26 (1st Dist. 1988), the
Illinois Appellate Court for the First District concluded that headhunting fees, inventory loading, and endless chains are not required to
prove the existence of an illegal pyramid sales
scheme.
Background
Unimax, Inc. ("Unimax"), an Illinois corporation, engaged in two separate activities: Unimax
Buyers' Service and Unimax Matrix. Unimax
Buyers' Service members, or "subscribers," completed an application and paid initial, monthly,
and annual fees for the opportunity to purchase
products and services at a discount. Subscribers
were not obligated to make any purchases and
could withdraw from the service at any time and
obtain a refund of their unused fees.
Members of Unimax Matrix, or "marketers,"
signed an "Independent Marketer's Agreement" and were given training in selling memberships in the Unimax Buyers' Service. Unimax
required marketers to recruit at least three new
subscribers, and to keep themselves and their
subscribers up to date on fee payments. Marketers earned monthly commissions on the fees
paid by the subscribers they sponsored. They
also received commissions on subscription fees
from subscribers in their "down-line" organization. Commission rates increased according to
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ditional pyramid scheme offers buyers the right
to sell new memberships, thereby moving others to become buyers. Unimax argued that its
marketing plan was unlike a typical pyramid
scheme because marketers' commissions were
determined by the sale of subscriptions and
were a percentage of the subscribers' fees. Unimax further distinguished its plan from the traditional pyramid scheme by noting that it did not
require its marketers to purchase and retain
non-refundable merchandise.
The trial court found that membership in the
Unimax Buyers' Service, rather than commissions from sales of memberships, was the benefit
received by Unimax marketers. According to
the court, this benefit was not primarily based
on the inducement of additional subscribers.
Therefore, the trial court granted Unimax's motion for summary judgment and the State appealed.
Illinois Appellate Court
On appeal, the State argued that it was possible to infer from the undisputed facts that Unimax's marketing plan was a pyramid scheme.
First, the State alleged that Unimax marketers
exchanged something of value when they signed
the marketer's agreement in that the agreement
itself was a form of consideration. Second, the
State claimed that the opportunity to receive a
benefit-commissions-was unrelated to the
sale of goods or services through the Unimax
Buyers' Service because commissions could be
gained only by inducing others to become
members.
Unimax maintained that its practices did not
meet the criteria for a pyramid scheme established by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"):
payment of money by participants in return for
the right to sell a product, and for the right to
receive, in return for recruiting other participants into the program, benefits unrelated to
the sale of the product. Unimax further maintained that its methods were atypical of classic
pyramid schemes. Unimax did not require the
payment of a large sum of money as an entry fee
("headhunting") nor did it require the purchase

of non-refundable inventory ("inventory loading"). It did not pressure subscribers to recruit
new participants, nor did it create endless chains
of members. With regard to the allegation that
the opportunity to receive commissions was
unrelated to the sale of goods or services, Unimax argued that commissions were earned for
selling the Unimax system, and not for recruiting
others to recruit.
The appellate court held that the trial court
erred in granting Unimax's motion for summary
judgment. The appellate court stated that the
Act, not FTC decisions, sets the proper standard
for determining the illegality of a multi-level
marketing scheme. Under the Act, unlawful
conduct is not limited to headhunting fees,
inventory loading and other practices identified
by the FTC as part of pyramid schemes. Unimax
marketers' commissions were contingent upon
the recruitment of new members and the payment of subscription fees by the marketers and
their down-line subscribers. Accordingly, there
was as much opportunity to earn commissions
by inducing additional persons to participate in
the plan as there was by selling the Unimax service. It was significant to the court that Unimax
levied an extra start-up fee against those who
wanted to sell subscriptions without becoming
subscribers themselves, and that no individuals
had chosen this alternative. All subscribers had
signed marketing agreements. The court held
that Unimax's emphasis upon recruiting new
members rather than on selling the product was
evidence of a pyramid scheme.
Based upon these undisputed facts, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in concluding that the benefit received in the multilevel marketing plan was membership in the
Buyers' Service. The only apparent way to have
obtained a benefit through Unimax's marketing
plan was to sponsor new subscribers and to earn
commissions on new subscribers' membership
fees. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed
the order of summary judgment in favor of
Unimax and remanded the case to the lower
court for further proceedings.
M. E.Welsh

